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1. Introduction
The average rate of youth temporary employments aged 15-24 years (fixed term employment)1) across
all OECD countries was 17.6% in 1982, 20.2% in 1992, 23.5% in 2002, and 24.7% in 2012. In Japan,
the rate of youth temporary employment was 9.3% in 1982, 13.7% in 1992, 26.8% in 2002, and 26.9%
in 2012. Generally speaking, temporary workers are the first to be dismissed during a recession because
employment protection legislation for temporary employment is weaker than that for regular employment.
In Japan, employment insurance finally covered most temporary workers from 2010. After the economic
downturn precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008, many dispatched workers whose em-
ployment contracts were terminated also lost their homes. This revealed some problems, namely, that the
earnings of dispatched workers were too low and these workers were not covered by social security at the
termination of their employment contracts.
To shed light on these problems, we first estimate the rate of temporary workers of OECD countries
from 2000 to 2011. The percentage of youth in regular employment has been decreasing because employ-
ment protection legislation covers regular but not temporary employment (OECD, 2004). Next, we examine
and demonstrate how gross domestic product (GDP), the minimum wage of regular employment, and em-
ployment protection legislation influence the rate of temporary workers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple survey of previous ap-
proaches. Section 3 examines factors that increase numbers of temporary workers. Section 4 estimates the
rate of temporary workers using panel data analysis. Section 5 examines the relationship between tempo-
rary employment and the adjustment speed of employment. Section 6 compares temporary employment in
Europe with Japan. Section 7 discusses the problem of employment protection of Japan and concludes.
2. Previous Approaches
There are well-known substitution effects in different age groups in Japan in which youth employment
and wages are affected by the employment and wages of other age groups. Japan entered a recession in
the 1990s and the protection of older regular employees restrained youth employment. Such substitution ef-
fects often occur in countries in which there is strong employment protection for regular employment and
there are difficulties in adjusting employment to business fluctuations. Piore (1970), Doeringer and Piore
(1971), Umemura (1971), and Nakamura (1975) analyze employment adjustment by temporary workers.
They explain that the youth temporary employment rate increased because employment protection for regu-
lar employment was strong and temporary workers became a buffer for business fluctuations. Abe (2005),
Mitani (2007), Hara (2010), and Noda (2010) analyze the labor demand of temporary workers.
Abe (2005) analyzes female temporary workers and proves that digitization by information and com-
munications technology causes female regular employment to decrease and female temporary employment
to increase.
Mitani (2007) develops a panel data analysis using OECD data and proves that the rate of youth tem-
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porary employment is high in the country where it is difficult for the relative wages of regularly em-
ployed youths to decline. He explains that downward rigidity of regular employment wages increased the
rate of youth temporary employment in the 1990s.
Hara (2010) applies the analysis of Sasaki and Sakura (2004) that technological progress biased toward
skills and globalization causes a shift in male regular workers toward higher educated employment. Hara
(2010) proves that factors increasing temporary employment are recession, globalization, and technological
innovation and that technological progress needs to be supported by differential factor prices.
Noda (2010) use questionnaire data for small and medium enterprises to prove that labor unions re-
strain the dismissal of regular workers and increase temporary employment.
We use panel data analysis to prove factors that increase temporary employment in order to character-
ize Japanese temporary employment.
3. Increasing Temporary Employment Rate in OECD Countries
The average rate of youth temporary employment across OECD countries was 25.25% in 2011, com-
prising 61.41% in Spain, 47.75% in the Netherlands, 26.42% in Japan, and 13.49% in the UK. The rate
of temporary employment in the UK is low because of high mobilization of employment. The reason why
the rate of the Netherlands is high is related to the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement. The Dutch economy was
in recession in the early 1980s, the unemployment rate was high, and there was large deficit financing.
Employer organizations, labor unions, and the government reached the so-called Wassenaar Agreement,
which stipulated that labor unions accept wage restraints, the government reduce deficit financing, and em-
ployer organizations reduce working hours and increase employment. This agreement led to a recovery of
the Dutch economy.2) In Japan, the rate of temporary employment has been increasing since 1986 when
the Law for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working
Condition for Dispatched Workers (Worker Dispatching Law) was enacted.
The average rate of youth temporary employment across OECD countries was twice that of total tem-
porary workers in 2011. The rate of youth temporary employment was higher than that of total temporary
workers in each OECD country.3) As the OECD Employment Outlook (2004) clarifies, the percentage of
youth in regular employment is decreasing because employment protection legislation covers regular but not
temporary employment. Figure 1 shows the relationship between employment protection for regular employ-
ment and the rate of youth temporary employment. The figure shows that the stronger the employment
protection for regular employment is, the higher the rate of youth temporary employment is.
Figure 1
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If youth temporary employment acts as a buffer for business fluctuations, then good business increases
the youth temporary employment rate and there is correlation between the youth temporary employment
rate and GDP.
If there is a wage gap between regular and temporary workers, then an increase in temporary employ-
ment decreases labor costs. Therefore, the minimum wage for regular and temporary workers and labor
costs affect the youth temporary employment rate.
4. Panel Data Analysis
4.1. Regression Model
As mentioned in Section 3, the reason the youth temporary employment rate has been increasing is that
employment protection legislation for regular employment has been retained but temporary employment has
been deregulated. The OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of the strictness
of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts4). Other factors affecting the youth tempo-
rary employment rate are business fluctuations, the minimum wage for regular employment (The OECD in-
dicators of employment protection does not include the minimum wage for regular employment), and labor
costs. We estimate the youth temporary employment rate for 21 OECD countries for the years 2000-2011.
OECD statistics5) provide annual data on GDP, the youth temporary employment rate, minimum wages for
regular employment, the strength of employment protection for regular and temporary employment, and la-
bor costs. The total regression model is
logTEMPORARY = α0 + α1 logGDP + α2 logwages + α3 logRPROTECT
+ α4 logTPROTECT + α4 logCOMPENSATION + ei (1)
TEMPORARY is the temporary employment rate for the 15-24 year age group,6) GDP is GDP per
head in constant US dollar prices (reference year 2005), wages represents minimum wages relative to the
average of full-time workers, RPROTECT is the strength of employment protection for regular employment,
TPROTECT is the strength of employment protection for temporary employment. COMPENSATION repre-
sents labor costs, including wages, salaries, and employers’ social contributions in constant US dollar
prices (reference year 2005).
If GDP increases, then employment increases and temporary employment is expected to increase (α1>
0). If the minimum wage for regular employment increases, the cost of regular employment increases and
the relative cost of temporary employment is expected to decrease (α2>0). If employment protection for
regular employment becomes stronger, the temporary employment rate is expected to increase in order to
adjust employment for business fluctuations (α3>0). On the contrary, if employment protection for tempo-
rary employment becomes stronger, temporary employment is unable to adjust employment and is expected
to decrease (α4<0). Labor cost is the total cost incurred by employers maintaining their regular and tempo-
rary employees, including wages and salaries, employment insurance, health insurance, and vocational train-
ing costs. The labor cost increases as the mean factor cost increases (α5<0).
4.2. Empirical Results
The null hypothesis is not rejected under the Hausman test statistic and the random effect model is ac-
cepted because the p-value from chi-square statistics is 6.44. The null hypothesis is rejected under the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test statistic, and the random effect model is accepted because the
p-value from chi-square statistics is 193.48. Then, regarding the coefficient of determination, R2, within R2
is 0.2041, between R2 is 0.8727, and overall R2 is 0.8338. All estimates other than minimum wages for
regular employment are statistically significant at the 5% level, all estimated coefficients other than labor
compensation are positive, and the stronger the employment protection for the regular employment is, the
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higher the temporary employment rate is.
logTEMPORARY = 6.048626 + 1.19937＊1 logGDP + 0.0974908 logwages
(11.75) (0.42)
+ 0.2858246＊ logRPROPTECT + 0.1317495＊ logTPROTECT
(1.94) (3.03)
− 1.692356＊ logCOMPENSATION
(−6.74)
R2=0.8338
The value given in parenthesis is the z-value and the superscript star means the result is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
Next, we estimate the regression model without minimum wages for regular employment. The null hy-
pothesis is not rejected under the Hausman test statistic and the random effect model is accepted because
the p-value from chi-square statistics is 6.96. The null hypothesis is rejected under the Breusch and Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test statistic and the random effect model is accepted because the p-value from chi-
square statistics is 285.93. Then, within R2 is 0.1932, between R2 is 0.8548, and overall R2 is 0.8205. All
estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. All estimated coefficient other than labor compensa-
tion are positive.
logTEMPORARY = 3.547115 + 1.138207＊ logGDP + 0.2580117＊ logRPROTECT
(13.61) (2.53)
+ 0.0988144＊ logTPROTECT − 1.33158＊ logCOMPENSATION
(2.59) (−8.97)
R2=0.8205
The value given in parenthesis is the z-value and the superscript star means the result is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
α1>0 indicates that an increase of GDP increases the temporary employment rate. This means that the
temporary employment rate become low in a recession and temporary workers are used for employment
adjustment. The estimates of employment protection for regular and temporary employment are positive and
strengthening of employment protection for temporary employment does not decrease the youth temporary
employment rate. However, in 1997 in Spain, the temporary employment rate declined sharply and youth
unemployment rate increased when employment protection legislation for regular employment was retained
and legislation for temporary employment was strengthened7). Thus, there is a need to modify employment
protection carefully. The result that the estimates of labor costs are negative means that an increase of la-
bor costs prompts the dismissal of temporary workers. That is, when wages or employers’ social contribu-
tions increase, temporary workers are dismissed for the purpose of decreasing costs. This is because in the
European Union (EU), legislation requires equal pay for work of equal value, the wage gap between regu-
lar and temporary workers is small, and employment of part-time workers does not reduce labor costs.
5. Temporary Employment and the Adjustment Speed of Employment
This section presents the relationship between temporary employment and the adjustment speed of em-
ployment. Temporary employment has a buffer function for business fluctuations and we expect there to
be positive correlation between the temporary employment rate and adjustment speed of employment. The
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regression model for the adjustment speed of employment is
lnNt = C + εlnYt + βln(Wt / P) + γlnNt−1 (2)
where Nt is the number of workers, Yt is real GDP, and W / P is real wages.
We denote the adjustment speed of employment by 1−γ; the closer 1−γ approaches one, the faster the ad-
justment speed of employment is.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between temporary employment and the adjustment speed of employ-
ment. It shows that the variance between the temporary employment rate and adjustment speed of employ-
ment is large.
Figure 3 shows the relationships between the rate of part-time workers and adjustment speed of em-
ployment in OECD countries. As the proportion of part-time workers becomes high, the adjustment speed
of employment becomes high. The figure shows that the dismissal of part-time workers is effective for the
purpose of adjusting employment. Therefore, the high rate of youth temporary employment in OECD coun-
tries is related to employment protection for regular employment. As the economy develops and employ-
ees’ jobs are guaranteed, temporary workers are dismissed for the purpose of adjusting employment.
EU countries are in the same stage of economic development as Japan and guarantee employees’ jobs.
Figure 2
Figure 3
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Figure 4 Figure 5
In the next section, we compare temporary employment in the EU with that in Japan.
6. Comparison between EU and Japanese Temporary Employment
EU countries faced high rates of unemployment and deficit financing in the 1980s. Various employ-
ment policies were implemented, for example, work-sharing by reducing working hours (France and Ger-
many); equal pay for work of equal value (the Netherlands); dual systems8) (Germany, Austria, Denmark,
and Switzerland); and a New Deal policy (the UK). In the same timeframe in Japan, high levels of gov-
ernment expenditure created many jobs in a period of rapid economic growth and a lifetime employment
system was established in order to secure personnel resources over a long period. Consequently, Japan did
not have labor market programs (LMPs). Since the asset bubble burst of the early 1990s, Japan’s financial
institutions have held enormous bad loans, and its economy has been in a long-term recession. Corpora-
tions dismissed numerous employees in order to avoid bankruptcy. Since the Worker Dispatching Law was
enacted in 1986, part of labor demand has been substituted9) with temporary employment. Temporary em-
ployment facilitates employment adjustment and promotes low wage costs because the Worker Dispatching
Law does not prohibit very low wages of temporary workers or very long working hours, while the pe-
riod of worker dispatching was deregulated in 2014 to enable indefinite dispatching. In this section, we
compare temporary employment in the EU with that in Japan using data of Eurostat10) and the Japan Insti-
tute for Labor Policy and Training.11)
6.1 Number of Regular and Temporarily Employed Workers by Age
Figure 4 shows the number of male regular and temporary workers by age group in Japan, while Fig-
ure 5 shows that of female workers in Japan. Figure 6 shows the number of male regular and temporary
workers by age group in EU countries, while Figure 7 shows that of female workers in EU countries. The
number of regular workers in both EU countries and Japan shows a gradual increase with age, peaks, and
then gradually decreases. The number of male temporary workers in EU countries and Japan is equal
across individual age groups.
On the contrary, in the case of female workers, the EU differs from Japan. The number of female
regular and temporary workers in EU countries increases gradually with age, peaks, and then decreases
gradually. The 40-54 year age group comprises the largest number of female workers in EU countries.
In the case of Japan, the number of female regular workers increases gradually with age, peaks, and
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Figure 6 Figure 7
Table 1. Share of women in part-time workers in 15 EU countries
EU
(15 countries)
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece
Share of women in
part-time workers
37.6 43.5 35.8 45.0 34.9 11.8
Spain Austria Portugal Netherlands Finland Sweden
Share of women in
part-time workers
24.4 44.4 14.1 76.9 19.4 38.6
UK France Italy Luxembourg
Share of women in
part-time workers
42.3 30.0 31.0 36.1
then decreases gradually, and the 25-29 year age group comprises the largest number of female regular
workers.
The reason the peak occurs in the 25-29 year age group is that many female regular workers exit the la-
bor market in order to have and raise children. The number of female temporary workers is equal across
individual age groups. These figures show that it is difficult for Japanese female workers who exited the
labor market to have children to return to the labor market. The reason is that there are few nursery
schools in Japan and women with children find it difficult to work and raise children.
Table 1 shows that the average rate of female part-time workers across 15 EU countries is 37.6%
while it is 67.5% in Japan. The proportion of female part-time workers in Japan is as high as the Nether-
lands. However, the wages of Japanese part-time workers are much lower than those in the Netherlands.
The wages of regular and temporary workers by age group are presented in Subsection 6.3.
6.2 Number of Regular and Temporary Workers by Economic Activity
Figure 8 shows the number of regular and temporary workers by economic activity in Japan and Fig-
ure 9 shows the number of workers whose employment is of indefinite duration and those employed on a
fixed-term basis by economic activity in EU countries. In the case of both EU countries and Japan, the
manufacturing sector employs the most regular workers (workers whose employment is of indefinite dura-
tion), followed by wholesale and retail trade, human health and social welfare, transportation and storage,
and construction. In addition, there are large numbers of regular workers in EU countries in education,
public administration, and accommodation and food services, but there are relatively few regular workers in
these industries in Japan. In the case of temporary employment in Japan, the manufacturing sector employs
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Figure 8
Figure 9
the largest number of workers, followed by wholesale and retail trade and health and social welfare. In
EU countries, there are few fixed-term employment workers in manufacturing while the French government
prohibits the dispatch of workers to dangerous jobs. This proves that EU countries consider the safety of
workers differently from Japan.12)
6.3 Wages of Regular and Temporary Workers by Age
Figure 10 shows the wages of male regular and temporary workers by age in Japan; the wages are in-
dexed using the wages of regular workers aged 20-24 years as 100. Figure 11 shows the wages of female
workers by age in Japan (male=204,100 yen, female=196,000 yen).13) Male regular workers aged 50-54
years earn the highest of all regular workers: their wages are twice those of regular workers aged 20-24
years. The wages of male temporary workers aged 20-24 years are lower than those of male regular work-
ers and increase gradually such that the wages of male temporary workers aged 30-34 years are a little
higher than those of male regular workers aged 20-24 years. After the age of 30-34 years, the wages of
male temporary workers change only a little. Female regular workers aged 50-54 years earn the highest of
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Figure 10 Figure 11
all female regular workers: their wages are up to one and a half times higher than those of regular work-
ers aged 20-24 years. The growth rate of the wages of female regular workers is lower than that of male
regular workers. The wages of female temporary workers aged 20-24 years are lower than those of female
regular workers and increase gradually. Female temporary workers aged 30-34 years earn the highest of all
age groups in female temporary employment, although the highest wages are lower than those of female
regular workers aged 20-24 years. In other words, in Japan, the wages of male and female temporary
workers increase only a little with age.
Figure 12 shows average wages of regular and temporary workers by sex and age group in Japan; the
wages are expressed as relative values, assuming that the average wages of male regular and temporary
workers aged 20-24 years (200,500 yen) can be defined as 100. The wages of male workers increase
gradually, reaching a peak at 50-54 years, decreasing gradually thereafter, and increasing a little over the
age of 70 years. The wages of female workers increase smoothly, reaching a peak at 45-49 years, decreas-
ing smoothly thereafter, and becoming equal to the wages of female workers aged 25-29 years. The peak
wages of female workers are about 1.3 times more than the wages of male regular workers aged 20-24
years.
Figure 13 shows average wages of regular and temporary workers by sex and age group in EU coun-
tries; the wages are expressed as relative values, assuming that the average wages of male regular and tem-
porary workers aged less than 30 years (11.41 euros) can be defined as 100.14) Both male and female
workers over the age of 30 years earn more than average wages of male regular and temporary workers
aged less than 30 years. In 15 EU countries, wages of both males and females increase with age and
reach a peak over the age of 60 years. The growth rate of wages is smooth: the average wages of male
workers over 60 years of age is about 1.8 times that of male regular workers aged less than 30 years,
and the average wages of female workers over 60 years of age is about 1.4 times average wages of male
workers aged less than 30 years. At the peak of wages, the wage gap between males and females in 15
EU countries is smaller than that in Japan.
Table 2 shows hourly earnings by employment contract in 15 EU countries in 2011. The average pro-
portion of part-time workers’ wages to full-time workers’ wages across 15 EU countries is 81.7%; the pro-
portion is 30.7% in the US and 55.9% in Japan.15) The earnings gap in Japan is larger than that of the 15
EU countries and smaller than that of the US.
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6.4 Comparison of Wages by Economic Activity and Employment Contract
Figure 14 shows wages of regular and temporary workers by economic activity in Japan. The industries in
which wages of regular workers are relatively high are electricity; gas and steam; air conditioning; water
supply; information and communication; financial and insurance activity; professional, scientific, and technical
activity; and education. The industries in which the wage gap between regular and temporary workers is
relatively small are mining, quarrying, and construction.
Figure 15 shows wages of regular and temporary workers by economic activity in 15 EU countries.
The wages of workers with indefinite duration employment are the largest in the financial and insurance
activities industry. The other wages are less than two thirds those of the financial and insurance activities
industry. The wage gap between regular and temporary workers is large in the following industries: finan-
cial and insurance activities, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate activity. The wages
of workers with indefinite duration employment are about twice those of fixed-term employment workers.
The wage gaps between regular and temporary workers in other industries are small.
Therefore, we can see that in Japan, it is difficult for female workers who exited the labor market in
order to have and raise children to return to the labor market. Among EU countries, France prohibits the
dispatch of workers to dangerous jobs while there are fewer fixed-term employment workers in the EU
who are engaged in manufacturing than in Japan. In Japan, the wage gap between regular and temporary
workers and that between male and female workers are larger than those of EU countries.
Table 2. Hourly earnings of regular and temporary workers in 15 EU countries
WORKTIME
15 EU
countries
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Spain
Part-time 13.78 16 22.33 14.37 16.56 10.14
Full-time 16.87 19.82 27.54 18.11 23.33 11.81
WORKTIME France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal
Part-time 14.81 10.69 22.04 15.26 12.43 7.04
Full-time 16.63 15.09 21.94 19.37 15.58 7.76
WORKTIME Finland Sweden UK Norway
Part-time 15.76 14.48 13.28 23.16
Full-time 18.47 17.42 18.02 29.33
Figures 12 Figure 13
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Figure 14
Figure 15
7. Conclusion
EU countries were in recession in the early 1980s and the youth unemployment rate rose. OECD
countries currently face high youth unemployment rates. The factors influencing youth unemployment are
stagnation, a high minimum wage for regular employment, unemployment benefits, tax, employment protec-
tion legislation for regular workers, and a supply-demand mismatch in employment. Moreover, the propor-
tion of youth temporary employment to regular employment is increasing because employment protection
legislation for regular employment has been retained but legislation for temporary employment has been
deregulated (OECD Employment Outlook). The youth temporary employment rate was twice that of the to-
tal temporary rate in 2012.16) In Japan, many temporary employment workers had not been able to partici-
pate in employment insurance before employment insurance legislation was revised in 2010. The wages of
Japanese temporary workers are much less than those in the EU. To shed light on these problems, we
first examined the factors influencing the increasing temporary employment rate using panel data analysis
in OECD countries and then compared Japanese temporary employment with that of the EU. Consequently,
we showed that the youth temporary employment rate increases with stronger employment protection for
regular and temporary employment. The youth temporary employment rate was shown to decrease as labor
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costs or GDP increase. These results indicate that temporary employment is used for employment adjust-
ment and reduction of labor costs. Section 5 presented the relationship between the adjustment speed of
employment and temporary employment rate in Japan, and the relationship between the adjustment speed
of employment and part-time employment rate in OECD countries. Consequently, we showed that the ad-
justment speed of employment is high in countries in which the proportion of part-time employment work-
ers is high, signaling that part-time workers are used for employment adjustment. That is, the high rate of
youth temporary employment in OECD countries is related to employment protection for regular employ-
ment and it becomes difficult to adjust employment with business fluctuations because regular workers’
jobs are guaranteed during periods of economic growth. Therefore, temporary workers are used for em-
ployment adjustment in a country in which there is stringent protection for regular employment. EU coun-
tries are in the same stage of economic development as Japan and there is stringent protection for regular
employment in both EU countries and Japan. Section 6 presented a comparison between temporary em-
ployment in EU countries and Japan. While few female workers in EU countries exit the labor market in
order to marry or have and raise children, in Japan, many female workers do so. Among EU countries,
France prohibits the dispatch of workers to dangerous jobs, while there are fewer fixed-term workers in
the EU who are engaged in manufacturing than in Japan. In Japan, the wage gap between regular and
temporary workers and that between male and female workers are larger than those of EU countries.
Working conditions for temporary workers in Japan are worse than those in EU countries. If temporary
workers are used for employment adjustment, employers’ incentive to increase temporary workers rises as
the wage gap between regular and temporary workers increases.
In Japan, employment protection legislation obliges employers to avoid dismissing regular workers; em-
ployers have to terminate employment contracts for temporary workers before dismissing regular workers.17)
That is, the legislation allows them to use temporary workers for employment adjustment. The stability of
the working life of regular workers is guaranteed by employment adjustment using temporary workers. The
reason employment protection for temporary workers is weak in Japan is that temporary workers have
tended to be housewives who earn secondary income. However, currently, about one third of young work-
ers are temporarily employed and they earn very low wages and work very long hours. Thus, Japan has
to improve working conditions for temporary workers and relax protection for regular employment. How-
ever, increasing labor costs would cause a decrease in youth temporary employment. Therefore, it is im-
portant to improve working conditions for temporary workers together with various policies that guarantee
a living for workers.
Shirakawa (2005) proved that the structural unemployment rate is increasing and the structural unem-
ployment rate of young workers is especially high. He performed a regression analysis of the structural
unemployment rate and part-time employment rate, and proved a strong correlation between them. That is,
in the case of young people, the structural unemployment rate increases with the part-time employment
rate. Because temporary employment is useful in Japan not only for employment adjustment but also to
reduce labor costs, the earnings of many young people are low and this is one of the unstable factors of
the Japanese economy.
This study showed that the wage gap between full-time and part-time workers in Japan is larger com-
pared to EU countries and temporary employment is useful to reduce labor costs. In a future study, we
will analyze the effects of the youth temporary employment rate and the wage gap between regular and
temporary workers on the Japanese economy.
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Abstract
Many temporary employment workers in Japan currently labor under severe employment conditions,
such as very low wages, overtime work, and exclusion from workers compensation. However, in most Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, employment conditions are better
than those in Japan. Therefore, we believe it would be significant to determine the factors that influence
Japan’s temporary workers to labor under severe employment conditions. We estimate temporary employ-
ment functions in OECD countries by analyzing panel data for the period 2000-2011 and compare tempo-
rary employment in the European Union (EU) to that in Japan. The results of our analyses are as follows.
(1) Employment protection legislation increases the rate of youth temporary employments and this is used
for cost adjustments. (2) In OECD countries, part-time workers are used as a buffer against business fluc-
tuations. (3) In the case of female regular workers in Japan, the 25-29 year age group is the largest,
whereas in the EU, it is the 40-54 year age group. (4) In Japan, female temporary workers are almost
equally distributed across all age groups. However, in the EU, the 40-54 year age group has the largest
number of such workers. (5) The wage gap by employment contract and by gender is large in Japan.
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